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Introduction
One of the greatest challenges in teaching an introductory philosophy course is
convincing students that there are, indeed, reliable standards for the evaluation
of arguments. Too often introductory students criticize an argument simply by
contesting the truth of one of its claims. And far too often the only claim in an
argument that meets serious objections is its conclusion. For many students,
the idea that an argument displays a structure that can be evaluated on its own
terms is not very difficult to grasp; however, without a great deal of practice, the
idea is grasped only in an abstract way, with insufficient appreciation of how
structural problems manifest themselves in concrete arguments, and without
the vocabulary for formulating structural criticisms. We have designed a
program that helps students develop some appreciation for both the standards
of argument assessment and for the function of argumentation. The most
conspicuous virtue of this program is that it can be learned quickly, thereby
leaving most of the term free to study the traditional, substantive issues that
make introductory philosophy so much fun. Additionally, since fundamental
concepts such as validity and soundness are put to work from the start, the
program yields results that are obvious to students; the immediate rewards, of
course, add to the fun.
The system we use is a modified version of Aristotle’s syllogistic logic. We
don’t introduce the terminology of figures and moods, nor do we worry about
Existential Import. With the basic logical thinking that we’re trying to teach, this
only adds technical details while providing no obvious benefits. Also, the logic
unit focuses entirely on intermediate inferences, leaving aside immediate
inferences (along with the square of opposition). What remains after these
modifications is a deductive system for the analysis and evaluation of
intermediate inferences in terms of distribution and negation rules. Without
formally studying the principles of immediate inference, students may not be
able to translate very sophisticated arguments, but consideration of such
arguments is best postponed anyway. Remember, we’re speaking of a
general introductory philosophy course, not a course devoted exclusively to
logic or critical thinking. With this always in mind, the instructor must carefully
formulate each exercise so that it makes its point clearly and without
unnecessary confusion. Not being held in check by translation difficulties,
students are able to move quickly to the evaluation of enthymemes and chain
arguments, which is where the normative power of logic can be most
impressive.
But this paper is not simply about teaching logic—it’s about pedagogy. The
introductory philosophy student’s inability to recognize argument structure
presents us with a problem that cannot be addressed simply by "teaching
logic." The problem that confronts us addresses a fundamental pedagogical
concern: Our task is to instill in the student the habit of clear thinking. When we
send our students out into the world, we have to make sure that they’re
prepared for it. This is not simply a matter of providing them with "tools." We’ve
looked at logic that way—and we’ve approached teaching logic that way—for
far too long. Certainly logic may be employed as a tool; it can serve as an
incredibly powerful tool, as we who teach it know full well. But it’s not logic per
se that we should be concerned with in our introductory courses. We want to
teach our students how to think clearly and responsibly. There is certainly a
moral edge to this view of the situation, and the manner in which we approach
our pedagogical concern will not be without further philosophical prejudice. Our
pedagogical orientation, as with the technical details of our system, owes
much to Aristotle. We have found that giving our students the basics of term
logic serves our purpose well. We do not introduce it as a tool for argument
analysis—a strong case can easily be made for the superiority of truth-
functional logic in that respect—we present it, rather, in the way that a
kindergarten teacher brings toys into the classroom. And we make it clear that
term logic has limitations—it’s not an all-purpose tool. But again, that’s not the
point. Teaching the basics of term logic pulls the students into a way of thinking
that is ordered, directed, and clear. We do not deal with fallacies, for an
obvious reason: If you’re trying to instill a proper habit, you have to use a
proper model. We should not be teaching our students how not to do things. If
clear thinking is achieved, fallacious reasoning will be recognizable. Instead of
beginning with criticism, we focus first on clarity. We also keep in touch with the
content of the arguments: Term logic preserves the content of the arguments in
a way that truth-functional logic can only envy, and students appreciate this
contact with the real world.
Although the system is derived from Aristotle’s term logic, we have made a
number of modifications that are designed to meet the needs and abilities of
first-year university students. We have identified 5 special constraints and
demands of teaching any system of logic in an introductory philosophy course.
While it may be possible to satisfy these conditions with another system of
deductive logic, we are confident that the program we use is pedagogically
superior. Appendix I outlines our reasons for preferring our system to
Sentential Logic or Venn Diagramming (we want to focus the presentation on
our own program). The five special constraints are as follows:
1 For first-year students, the less that needs to be presupposed the better.
2 It must be broad enough to apply to a wide variety of arguments.
3 It must encourage a systematic grasp of logical principles and concepts.
4 There must be an evaluative component.
5 Instruction must make efficient use of class time.
With judicious use of class time, all of the material can be covered in six hours.
Some instructors may prefer to study logic as a self-contained unit (either early
in the semester or several weeks into it); others may prefer to study the logic
one hour per week over the course of six weeks. (In the next section of the
presentation, we will assume that the logic unit consists of six one-hour
classes, spread out over two weeks). Now we’ll outline the system itself, and
offer some strategic suggestions for its introduction. Then we can consider
how the system may be supplemented with class discussion of implication,
inductive logic, analogical arguments and so-called informal fallacies.
Teaching A Unit of Term Logic
As we all know, when teaching any subject in philosophy, it’s necessary to get
the students to think clearly on technical matters. This will assist them in
discerning the problems and puzzles central to the deeper issues. With logic,
it’s crucial that students get a clear presentation of the technical apparatus in
order to see the deeper issues involved in the justification of inferences. In
order to accomplish this, we recommend that translation difficulties be
minimized as much as possible. This recommendation applies both to
examples discussed in class and to arguments assigned as part of the
student’s take-home exercises. Also, it is important that the answers for the
take home exercises be readily available (on reserve, posted outside the
office, circulated with the exercises, etc.) so that students develop some
independence with the material and class time can be devoted to the
introduction of new material.
Session 1
We begin by exploiting the students’ intuitions about logical structure and by
drawing attention to the limitations of these intuitions and their bad habits. We
outlined the bad habits above: when evaluating an argument, they only
consider whether the conclusion of the argument is true. Before the first
session begins we write the following arguments on the blackboard:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Other men die.
I am not another man.
Therefore, I will not die. [from Vladimir Nabokov’s The Pale Fire]
The first session begins by distinguishing arguments from other forms of
prose, namely, exposition (a partial explanation), analysis (a complete
explanation) and narration (a chronological sequence of events). If students are
asked to define an argument, they inevitably characterize it as a tool of
persuasion. This conventional opinion must be addressed and challenged
immediately, but it is not necessary to spend a great deal of time on the task.
We suggest to students that a deeper, intrinsic function of an argument is to
justify a claim - and that it is because we think the main claim is true that
arguments can serve an extrinsic, persuasive function. Premises and
conclusions are introduced as the primary components of arguments, and they
are explained in connection with coordinating conjunctions and conjunctive
adverbs that function as logical connectors ("for," "since," "therefore," etc.).
Although the purpose of an argument is to justify a claim, i.e. the argument’s
conclusion, the grounds for the conclusion are found in the premises.
So far, nothing should strike students as strange or difficult. Now is the time to
draw attention to some of their bad habits. We ask them to assess the two
arguments on the board. Students generally agree without hesitation that the
first argument is good and that the second argument must contain a flaw. But
what, exactly, is the flaw in Nabokov’s argument? This is when the fun begins.
Because the argument’s defect is structural, students have difficulty formulating
a precise answer to this question. If someone says that the conclusion is false,
we point out that the truth of the conclusion ultimately rests on the argument’s
premises - aren’t the premises true? If someone says that the first premise is
problematic, we point out that even if the first premise does not tell the whole
story, it is true so far as it goes. If someone says that the second premise is
problematic, we tease the students: of course I’m not another man, I’m always
myself. Students must confront two things at once in this exercise: (1) their
intuitive - and in this case reliable - suspicions about Nabokov’s argument; and
(2) their inability to explain this response. At this point, the technical apparatus
of Aristotelian term logic can be introduced as a means for understanding the
latent features of familiar thought processes.
The remaining time in the first session is used to outline the method of analysis
and the procedures of evaluation for syllogistic arguments. We use the first
syllogism as a sample argument and we emphasize the principles of sentence
analysis for this session. Declarative sentences are explained in terms of a
familiar evaluative criterion: truth; i.e., the mark of a declarative sentence is that
it is capable of being true or false. Truth itself need not be explained in great
detail (fortunately), but it should be stressed to students that, in arguments, the
evaluative function of truth comes into play only in the assessment of premises.
Finally, some of the technical apparatus of term logic can be introduced: the
distinction between subject and predicate, the copula, quantification (all, some,
none), and the four categorical propositional forms ("a," "e," "i" and "o"). At this
point students should be able to translate English sentences into proper
categorical propositions. For example: "Most basketball players are tall"
becomes "Some S are P." Although sentence analysis is the focus of the first
class and the first set of exercises, students should be shown what the
complete analysis and evaluation of a syllogism looks like; to this end, we
analyze the entire sample argument about Socrates’ mortality. In the first
exercises, students are required to translate the conclusions in a set of
syllogisms; in every argument, the conclusion must be clearly indicated by
logical connectives.
Note: This is the best time to rehearse the fundamentals of punctuation. We’re
all sufficiently familiar with the problem of students coming to us with
inadequate knowledge of basic English grammar. Right here, at this point in
the course, you can solve part of that problem by quickly reviewing the proper
and improper uses of the period, comma, semicolon, colon, dash, and
apostrophe. It’s helpful to include something like Margot Northey’s excellent
little book, Making Sense, in your list of required texts for the course. You can
refer the students to it right here. If you have the time and interest, you might
also here consider a digression on the philosophy of language, or philology or
linguistics. As John Lyons writes (although not entirely accurately) in his
Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (Cambridge 1969, p.4): "Traditional
grammar, like so many other of our academic traditions, goes back to Greece
of the fifth century before Christ. For the Greeks ‘grammar’ was from the first a
part of ‘philosophy.’ That is to say, it was part of their general inquiry into the
nature of the world around them and of their own social institutions."
Assignment: 15-25 syllogisms with easy to identify conclusions. In the
passages used in this unit, the analysis proceeds best when students begin by
identifying the conclusion. In addition to giving students some experience at
translating sentences into propositional categorical form, the first set of
exercises is intended to get them in the habit of orienting their analysis of an
argument (rather than their assessment of it) around the conclusion.
Session 2
In this session you can build on the forms of the categorical proposition to
explain two matters: (1) some general considerations about the nature of
translation and interpretation; (2) some specific details regarding the technical
features of syllogistic arguments.
(1) Students need to understand the purpose and the underlying principles of
translating ordinary English into categorical propositional form. The underlying
principles of translation can be explained by means of some simple examples.
Consider the following set of sentences:
1. Snow is white.
2. La neige est blanc.
3. Schnee ist wiess.
4. All things that are snow (S) are things that are white (P).
Just as (1) can be translated as (2) or (3), so can it be translated as (4) and
abbreviated as All S are P. The advantages of using (2) or (3), rather than (1),
in France or Germany are obvious. What advantage does the categorical
propositional form promise? Quite simply, the abbreviated version of (4) may
be understood to belong to a language that has exactly four sentences;
moreover, the logical structure of any English sentence is exposed when it is
translated into categorical propositional form. This is a helpful way for students
to appreciate what the "meaning" of a sentence is - i.e., as that which survives
translation; categorical propositional form preserves the logical meaning of a
declarative sentence that has been stripped of its semantic content.
(2) Some features of the syllogism may be operationally defined using the
subject/predicate analysis of declarative sentences: major and minor terms,
major and minor premises, and the middle term. The most difficult concept of
the unit will inevitably be distribution. This topic may be broached now, but the
distribution rules for validity can be left until the next session, by which time
students will hopefully have won some familiarity with the analysis of the
syllogism. Distribution should definitely be introduced systematically, using the
following chart:
Universal affirmative: (d) S a P (u)
Universal negative: (d) S e P (d) [commutative terms]
Particular affirmative: (u) S i P (u) [commutative terms]
Particular negative: (u) S o P (d)
Commutation need not be discussed at all, but it may be introduced as a way
to speed the translation of universal negative and particular affirmative
propositions. At this point, students should be able to identify all the parts of a
syllogism.
Special problems with singular propositions and interpretative strategies for
dealing with the definite article and proper names should also be covered
during this session. Distribution can be used to explain why special problems
arise in these cases, and the cases can help clarify what distribution means.
The most efficient and effective way to explain how syllogistic analysis works
and how interpretive difficulties may be managed is by analyzing and
evaluating some carefully crafted examples on the blackboard.
Assignment: A series of arguments for translation into proper syllogistic form
and analysis. (See the accompanying exercises. We construct the syllogisms
for this set of exercises around the sentences to be translated in the Session I
exercises.)
Session 3
In this session, by reference to the rules of validity, the students examine some
of the most fundamental concepts of reasoning: truth, validity, soundness, and
distribution. The Nabokov argument is worth returning to now, for it can be
used to bring out the demonstrative and evaluative power of syllogistic
reasoning. (Some students may have already applied their new methods of
analysis and evaluation to this argument, and it may be possible to get a
student to put it on the blackboard when the time is right.)
The session opens with the distinction between truth and validity, and both
concepts should be explained as components of soundness, for the particular
rules of validity for term logic will then provide the students with the conceptual
tools with which to grasp these concepts. The Nabokov argument breaks down
this way:
Other men die.
I am not another man.
Therefore, I will not die.
All M are P (d) M a P (u)
No S are M (d) S e M (d)
No S are P (d) S e P (d)
The rules of validity make the structural problem with this argument crystal
clear: we have a fallacy of illicit major: P is distributed in the conclusion but not
in the major premise. At this point, the notion of distribution can be clarified
handily. Referring to this example, we point out that while not every member of
the class defined by P ( i.e., "things that die") is being referred to in the major
premise (in which P is therefore undistributed), yet the argument tries to draw a
conclusion about every member of the class (and so P is distributed there).
The discussion of distribution at this point seems in fact to sharpen the
students’ logical-intuitive abilities, and perhaps their healthy paranoia: the
students, not wanting to walk into a trap, suddenly begin to slow down and
focus more clearly on what is actually being stated in each individual
proposition before proceeding to the next one. For the rest of this session we
analyze and evaluate arguments that violate the rules of validity. So one
sample argument must contain an illicit minor term, another an undistributed
middle term and another must have unequal negatives. If there is time, one
valid but unsound argument can be analyzed as well.
Assignment: A series of arguments for translation into proper syllogistic form
and evaluation; students can both apply the rules of validity to the arguments
analyzed as part of the Session II exercises and work on new arguments.
Session 4
In this session the importance of clarity and conciseness is brought home to
the student. Two syllogisms should be written on the blackboard as examples.
The first syllogism should contain an obvious equivocation, and the second
should be an enthymeme. The first example can be used to discuss one
technical matter and two important concepts. The technical matter has to do
with the number of terms employed in an argument: a syllogism must contain
exactly three. The concepts are ambiguity and relevance. The discussion of
relevance in the context of the first example leads naturally into how to supply
the missing proposition in an enthymeme, the second example. By this time,
the sample arguments should look less artificial to students, since many of the
arguments used in everyday discourse are elliptical. It is possible to find
sample arguments in familiar sources. Now that enthymemes have been
introduced, students can see (a) how heavily an author can rely on readers to
interpret the gaps in an argument and (b) how much responsibility they have -
as readers - to interpret an argument reasonably. You can remind them that the
enterprise of argument evaluation will only succeed when a serious effort is
made to interpret a line of argument fairly; otherwise, any flaws they detect in
an argument could be attributed to their interpretation and not the argument
itself.
Assignment: A series of enthymemes.
Session 5
The analysis of lengthy passages containing syllogistic reasoning is effective in
demonstrating the scope and power of logical evaluation. We outline a step-
by-step procedure that gives students a means for analyzing and evaluating
telescoped or chain arguments; if the passages are carefully crafted, students
can master the procedure quite quickly. It is possible in one hour to
demonstrate the procedure by analyzing and evaluating two different chains,
each of which consists of at least three linked syllogisms. The function of
extended arguments can be explained in terms of sufficiency, a concept that
the student can grasp by seeing how a proposition presented as belonging to
one of the linked arguments may also be employed as a premise in another of
the arguments. We point out how the main conclusion of the chain is supported
by a premise that also requires support. Without a further argument in defense
of that premise, we do not have sufficient grounds to accept the main
conclusion. Of course, this explanation stretches the meaning of sufficiency
beyond its usual limits, but its purpose is get students thinking about the
concept, not to convey a definitive account of it. Appendix II outlines a step-by-
step procedure for the analysis and evaluation of extended arguments.
Assignments: Several chain syllogisms.
Session 6
This session should examine the limitations of term logic. It has proved useful
to consider simple arguments that make use of very basic truth-functional logic
(modus ponens, modus tollens, and the hypothetical syllogism are easily
enough explained and illustrated). While these can be translated into the form
of a categorical syllogism, the awkwardness of doing so is clearly prohibitive.
As powerful and precise as term logic can be in many cases, students should
know that the system they have learned has a limited field of application. At this
point, however, the battle is already won. The students are actively engaged in
the logical analysis and evaluation of arguments. While they do not have an all-
purpose system for use in the evaluation of every argument they encounter,
they now have a working appreciation for the structural features of argument
structure and some of the abstract concepts that are essential for analyzing
these features.
It is possible to expand the logic unit to introduce inductive argumentation,
arguments by analogy and arguments by hypothesis. Each of these argument
modes could be introduced in light of the very strong inferential connection
between the premise(s) and the conclusion of deductive arguments; that is,
whereas the conclusion of a deductive syllogism purports to follow from the
premise(s) with necessity, in other kinds of arguments, the conclusion only
follows with probability. However, it is possible – and in our view preferable - to
integrate these other forms of argumentation with the course’s substantive
material; an integrative approach can be used with informal fallacies as well.
Testing
An in-class test is the best way to assess the students’ development. The test
should include at least one three-proposition syllogism, at least one
enthymeme and one chain argument. The test need not focus only on technical
matters. The following consistent but invalid argument can instill one final and
important lesson:
Some eligible voters do not vote.
All 18 year olds are eligible to vote.
Therefore, some 18 year olds do not vote.
The argument is analyzed as follows:
Some M are not P. (u)MoP(d)
All S are M (d)SaM(u)
Some S are not P (u)SoP(d) Invalid (undistributed middle).
Most students expect this argument to be valid, and many are surprised when,
upon close analysis, it turns out to be invalid (one excellent student reported
that she was having a crisis in the exam room). When taking up the test with
the class later, we dwell on this argument, using it to convey two related
lessons: (1) just because the conclusion of an argument is consistent with a set
of premises, that does not mean that the premises guarantee the truth of the
conclusion; (2) not only do the new-found methods of analysis explain their
correct intuitions, (as they discovered with the Nabokov argument) but they can
also correct their mistaken intuitions.
Appendix I: The Relative Merits of Term Logic and Truth-Functional
Logic (handout only - not part of the presentation)
Using the five points listed on p. 2, we shall explain why a logic of terms is
desirable in the first place. Term logic does not recommend itself
overwhelmingly on each of the five points, but on all five it is at least the equal
to sentential logic. Moreover, the points on which it may be more strongly
recommended are crucial.
 
(1) We grant that truth-functional, sentential logic without the apparatus of
predicate notation should be accessible to first-year students. The rules of
bracketing and the system of notation needed for sentential logic should not
present special difficulties for any university students. Moreover, since the
sentences themselves are left unanalyzed, inferences can be represented
rather intuitively. Term logic, on the other hand, requires students to analyze
sentences, but the subject-predicate syntax required for this analysis should be
familiar. Additionally, the method of notation and representation needed for the
system we want to present does not require using any special symbols. The
most difficult new vocabulary that students encounter in our system is
"distribution," and it is our experience that the difficulties students have when
this concept is introduced resolve themselves after they get a little practice at
translating English sentences into proper categorical form. In terms of
accessibility, our system is probably the equal to truth-functional logic.
(2) Again, in terms of breadth, the two systems are comparable. Each has its
limitations, but this is inevitable given the specialized needs of studying logic
as only one part of the term’s work—and in terms of class time, only a small
part. All the same, term logic has surprising breadth when it is adapted to
accommodate enthymemes and chain syllogisms, and the system outlined in
our presentation is adapted to do precisely that.
(3) & (4) In its potential for depth and its evaluative power, a system of term
logic may be recommended over sentential logic. While these two
considerations (depth and evaluative power) are distinct, they are not
separable. It is precisely because our system of term logic has such a strong
evaluative component that it is able to convey some of the deeper, more
difficult concepts of argumentation. Almost from the start, students must make
use of such evaluative standards as truth, validity and soundness; it is also
possible to incorporate other abstract concepts, such as relevance,
consistency and sufficiency. And all of these notions can be introduced, and
successfully grasped by the student, in a quite brief presentation.
Sentential logic has pedagogical limitations in an introductory course that can
be explained succinctly. If the class studies only the inference rules and leaves
out truth-tables, two limitations immediately arise. First, students do not get any
practice at evaluating arguments, and secondly, students who only derive
proofs are likely to get the impression that all deductive arguments can be
made valid—one need only fill in the implied steps between the stated
premises and the stated conclusion. Yet in order for a class to study both the
inference rules and the truth-tables, a great deal of the class time has to be
given over to technical matters, so this strategy has simply to abandon the
demand of point 5, that the logic unit of an introductory course be covered
efficiently. (We’ll ignore the possibility that a class might study truth-tables
without studying inference rules.)
(5) We have already expressed doubts concerning the ability of sentential logic
to convey the normative dimension of logic in a sufficiently brief period of time.
This point is worth stressing: It is important that a logic unit in an introductory
course be no longer than is necessary. For two chief reasons, an introductory
philosophy course is not the place to examine issues in the philosophy of logic.
First, even a superficial treatment of such issues must demand far more time
and attention than can be devoted to them as components of merely one part
of one course. And second, the excitement of philosophy, for the overwhelming
majority of students in any general introductory philosophy course, will always
be found in the liveliness and diversity of its issues. The logic component of a
course should supplement and foster, not replace, this feature of the course.
Furthermore, if logic is introduced properly, students are less likely to get the
impression that the arguments offered in response to these issues and
problems are verbal trickery. Even if the structure of a particular argument—
say, for example, the argument from design—doesn’t lend itself to analysis in
terms of the system of logic that they have studied, students with some
background in logic will at least recognize that there must be some kind of
logical structure underlying the argument. The system we outline is designed to
instill an appreciation of the fact that all arguments have some kind of structural
component, and that this structure may be assessed apart from the argument’s
content.
What about Venn diagrams?
For three reasons, we do not use Venn diagrams. First, they give students a
technique for evaluating arguments, but they give no precise indication of what
rule of validity is violated in an invalid argument; the students know that the
argument is invalid, but they really don’t understand why. Second, the diagrams
become unworkable with enthymemes and - especially - chain arguments;
you’d need a blackboard the size of Kansas. And third, students inevitably find
some of the diagramming rules unintuitive—particularly those having to do with
the placement of x’s.
